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20 hours ago, Vindus said:

its not like instagram is filled with people waving guns around. I guess the court's gun expert should work with real law enforcement. 

It’s pretty crazy, we’re appealing it icly. 

Edited by Captain
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Spoiler

 

**All relevant parties would receive a copy of the following document. A copy would also be made available when reviewing the court transcript or browsing the Appeals section of the Courts website.**

 

 

Appellate Court of San Andreas

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Court Judgement 

After thorough review of the case of The State of San Andreas v. Ivan Ulloa [CF 159-20], the Appellate Court has come to a verdict on the allegations and is thus ready to deliver a ruling in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local law and/or ordinance to ensure fair and just enforcement of the law within the boundaries of the state. It is of the official opinion of the court that;


 

In the case of Ivan Ulloa v. The State of San Andreas, the Appellate Court of San Andreas finds reasonable legal grounds to reverse the conviction of Mr. Ulloa. WIthin this written opinion of the Court, all relevant legislation and case law shall be discussed in thorough detail.

 

On the matter of Admissibility of Evidence, with regards to social media posts, the court finds no wrongdoing on the part of the District Attorney’s Office nor the opinion of the Superior Court of San Andreas and the formative opinion of Justice James Livingston. 

 

The Court holds the same legal opinion of Magistrate Justice Paul W. Grimm of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in the case of Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. (2007) with regards to the admittance of Electronically Stored Information. Without proper Federal guidance or precedent on the matter, it is hereby held that a Trial Judge may make a preliminary determination with regards to the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) & 104(b), and once such an initial interpretation has been made by the Justice presiding over the case, the Federal Rules of Evidence do no longer apply to that exhibit. If a Justice deems such evidence initially inadmissible, for whatever reason, then it cannot.

 

Further, with regards to the admissibility of social media messages, the Court holds the same interpretation of the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeal in the context of the case United States v. Tank (2000). Whilst this is within regards to the admissibility of chat room logs, the Court finds it no different in legal basis to private messages, holding that such evidence may be presented so long as there is a prima facie showing of authenticity - establishing a connection between the evidence and the defendant. This decision is further supported by the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeal in the case of United States v. Black (1985), in which it was held:

 

"The government need only make a prima facie showing of authenticity, as "[t]he rule requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification."

 

With lack of a juror, it may be held that the Justice presiding over the case may make such a determination as they see fit with the evidence provided.

 

As noted by the Appellee, in this circumstance the statements made by the Appellant would satisfy Rule 804 and so such interpretation would not be necessary in the matter. I am only able to see an Electronic Search Warrant pertaining to data in the digital sale of narcotics - whilst the warrant applied for is clearly solely in relation to firearms. Despite this appearing as a solely clerical error, if the data had not eventually been submitted voluntarily then such would have remained inadmissible.

 

The Court shall hold that out of court testimony of lay witnesses will remain subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence and in such no further professional judgement shall be afforded to any lay witness.
 

On the matter of Statement of Fact, the Court finds that with regards to the statements provided by Detective Kowalski, in the position of an expert  witness, were not legally sufficient enough to satisfy the precedent established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993)

 

However, it does not appear that the prosecution had intended to call Detective Kowalski as an expert witness - although the court does find that she had been allowed to answer questions beyond the scope of her profession. Further analysis of the statements made may result in certain aspects of the statement being inadmissible, though, this is a matter that would ultimately lay undecided unless remanded to the lower court.  

 

It is of the opinion of the Court that both prosecuting and defending attorneys should maintain best practice by avoiding questions which may require a witness to answer outside the scope of their experience or expertise.
 

On the matter of Mens Rea, the Court finds that sufficient evidence to prove intent in relation to the charge of F(C) 108. Tampering with Evidence was not provided to the lower court by the District Attorney’s Office. 

 

Whilst Mr. Ulloa should have been aware of the investigation, the Court does not believe that the Appellant was reasonably aware of the scope of the investigation and so removal of social media in this instance does not substantiate spoliation of evidence.  The Court takes the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the matter of United States v. Safavian (2011). Though the aforementioned case was within regards to concealment, the Court finds that being forced to keep social media open due to an ongoing investigation would be considered somewhat of a ‘legal disclosure duty’ as it would be held against an individual’s First Amendment right.

 

Within the aforementioned case it was held as follows:

 

To comply with Fifth Amendment due process, a defendant must have "fair notice . . . of what conduct is forbidden. This 'fair warning' requirement prohibits application of a criminal statute to a defendant unless it was reasonably clear at the time of the alleged action that defendant's actions were criminal."

 

It is of the opinion of this Court that Mr. Ulloa was not given sufficient fair or legal notice that deletion of social media would be forbidden and constitute illegal criminal conduct and so the defense to the matter presented to the lower court can be held. The legal scope of the charge is found too vague as “anything used as evidence” is too broad of a definition since the wording implies that the accused must 100%, beyond a shadow of a doubt, know that something will be used as evidence. With regards to digital evidence, without sufficient notification, any accused cannot be totally certain. One cannot intentionally delete evidence if they are unaware of the status of an ongoing investigation which would require them to keep it active.

 

The Appellee has raised interesting facts of the timeline of events which may sway analysis, however, the precedent above still stands without further case law or additional proof of the mens rea. As a result, this Court finds that the mens rea evidence provided by the District Attorney’s Office to be insufficient and so cannot be legally held. The defense put forward by Mr. Ulloa, however, would be considered sufficient due to lack of proper notification.
 

On the matter of Application of Law, the Court finds in favour the Appellant. Further, the court finds the charge M(C) 602. Carrying an Unlicensed Firearm to be unconstitutional in definition under the scope of the Second Amendment and so makes ruling against the ‘State Handling of All Firearms & Training Act’, otherwise known as the ‘SHAFT Act’ under both Section 302(a) and 302(b) for legal contradiction to the Penal Code.

 

The Court takes the precedent of the Supreme Court ruling under the District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) in that an individual may possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, for any traditional lawful purpose. It is of the opinion of this Court that simply holding a firearm, whether licenced or unlicensed (with the exception of a felon), cannot be considered an unlawful purpose.

 

The Court has weighed the more recent decision of McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), in which it was recognised that the Second Amendment was not incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment and so gun restrictions are not unconstitutionally improper, however, the Supreme Court opted to remand the conflicts between certain restrictions and the Second Amendment to lower courts. Given this ruling, it is of the opinion of this Court that lower courts do have the ability to rule on such matters given San Andreas’ absence of an appeal circuit or present Federal courts.

 

It is explicitly stated within the Second Amendment that the “right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed” and so a restriction on carrying, holding, or temporarily possessing a firearm within the confines of one’s own private property may be deemed unconstitutional.

 

The Court would like to make clear that it is not ruling against the current licencing provisions within the State of San Andreas, it is only deeming that one possessing a legally licenced firearm (regardless of who it belongs to) within one’s own property cannot be deemed illegal. 

 

It is of the opinion of the Court that the State should modify the legislation to deem knowing possession of a stolen or unlicensed/illegal firearm illegal rather than general carrying of a firearm by an unlicensed individual within private property. Whilst this is already the case within the penal code, the SHAFT Act allows for unconstitutional contradictions of the matter and as such, it should be clarified.

 

Further, it may be held that the Appellee was unable to prove that the image of Mr. Ulloa holding what is believed to be a real firearm and without the firearm being submitted as evidence, it would not have been a legally sound conviction regardless of the unconstitutional nature of the legislation.
 

On the matter of the First Amendment, the Court cites the Supreme Court case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) in which it was stated that the Internet is subject to the full protections of the First Amendment, just like that of the printed press.

 

This Court does not find sufficient evidence to rule that there was a constitutional violation with regards to the First Amendment and so rules in favour of the Appellee. However, the Court does wish to refer to it’s earlier answer with regards to Mens Rea and social media. 

 

There has been a lack of higher court judgement with regards to the protection of the First Amendment in this application of Social Media so this court does not feel comfortable making a decision without proper national guidance.
 

And so, the above is held to be the opinion of the Appellate Court of San Andreas.


And thus in support of the narrative, it is the finding of the court that in the case matter at hand, the court rules; 


 

That the lower courts decision shall be reversed for reasons of;

  • Automatic reversal upon the notice that Mr. Ulloa's rights protected under the Second Amendment were infringed by the SHAFT Act and the Penal Code of the State of San Andreas.
  • Lack of Mens Rea evidence provided to sustain the charge of F(C) 108. Tampering with Evidence. Mr. Ulloa was reasonably unaware that he had a legal duty or requirement to maintain a social media presence for the purposes of an investigation by Law Enforcement.
  • Without 'fair notice' being issued alongside reasonable probable cause, being forced to maintain a social media account may violate First Amendment protections pending national guidance.
     

It is henceforth ordered by Judge William G. Randolph, and shall be carried out without delay. The court is now dismissed. 

 


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