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Midsummer Night's Dream

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  1. Username: JMidsomer Comment: Does Truman Stein ever say anything other than “Yea”? It seems like they didn’t program him to say anything else. Yesman Stein would be a more fitting name.
  2. Username: J.Midsomer Comment: Weak-minded and persecution. Mr. Spencer should be nowhere near public office. Fortunate for the decent and civilized, and unfortunate for Mr. Spencer, a lot stands in his way to prevent him from having his way — including fundamental rights, constitutional proscriptions and constitutional prescriptions. There are also the various actors who keep these enduring. Mr. Spencer, and anyone else of his ilk, is why many of us in the law profession continue to do what we do and and why we will continue to rise in defense of these rights and limits.
  3. Username: JMidsomer Comment: While some parts were interesting to read, I was alarmed by the misunderstanding and misstatement of the standard of proof in civil proceedings. The statement in question is also somewhat inaccurate, when read literally, for criminal proceedings too. The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is "beyond a reasonable doubt" — to describe this as beyond a "trace of doubt" would be too excessive because it suggests the proper test is beyond all doubt. The standard is not beyond all doubt. Expecting the government to bring a case without "even so much a trace of doubt" is the equivalent of saying the case must be beyond all doubt; which is, again, not the standard. The government is not required to extinguish all doubt; they are only required to dispel all reasonable alternative explanations. Without "a trace of doubt" is also not at all the standard of proof in civil proceedings! Thus, to say a plaintiff must "leave no trace of doubt" is alien to civil proceedings and plainly wrong! To succeed, a plaintiff is not required to instill confidence to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt; the standard that a plaintiff must meet in most civil proceedings is actually significantly lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt" and permits a lot more leeway for doubt. The standard applied to most civil trials is "preponderance of the evidence" and, for certain claims such as defamation involving public figures, the standard is pegged slightly higher at "clear and convincing," which is still below the standard in criminal proceedings. For an illustration, with mark-ups and notation in blue, see:
  4. Username: J.H.Midsomer Comment: PUBLIC RELEASE _________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MIDSOMER P.L.L.C. || Los Santos, San Andreas August 8, 2023 Mr. Spencer continues to play fast and loose with the truth, and his press release of August 7, 2023 is no different. His release is full of half-truths, equivocation, embellishment and fluff. He also misrepresents the record. Allow me to set the record straight: "In a recent legal battle, Jonathan Spencer, Chairman of the GOP, emerged victorious against a First Amendment lawsuit filed against him by Danielle Shaw." Dr. Bordeaux's complaint was a defamation action, not a "First Amendment lawsuit"—whatever that might mean. It was a tort action; and the only mention of the First Amendment in Dr. Bordeaux's claim was to preempt any attempts to rely on the First Amendment. "The lawsuit, which alleged violations of the First Amendment rights, saw Miss Shaw seeking $235,000 in damages." There was no allegation of "violating the First Amendment"—whatever that might mean—made against anyone. The claim consisted of defamation, IIED and civil conspiracy. Further, Dr. Bordeaux's claim was that the First Amendment, on a correct reading of the relevant authorities, could not protect the conduct against which the claim of defamation was made. "The court's ruling reaffirms the principle that open dialogue on matters of public interest must be shielded from unwarranted restrictions." The court's judgment made no such mention of "public interest." In fact, it made no attempt to analyze the First Amendment implications, or the relevant First Amendment caselaw. The judgment consisted of a short blanket statement. All of the other embellishments and fluff will become clear as proceedings continue to play out, including the pending appeal. * * * Unfortunately for Mr. Spencer, the person he targeted is tenacious. She is gritty and does not settle for what she knows is wrong. Dr. Bordeaux will continue pursuing the truth—because civility, decency and the truth still matter—in her appeal: Danielle Bordeaux v. Jonathan Spencer (23GJAP00011) A faithful review of the record will show that Spencer's claim to victory is a hollow one. Ironically, the record shows that, in appearing to give regard to the First Amendment—which it does not—the court in question violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and not once, but repeatedly and in a number of ways. A court cannot attempt to reinforce one constitutional guarantee by simultaneously violating four others (1. notice, 2. opportunity to be heard, 3. impartial / neutral decision-maker, 4. adversary process). To do so would award a meaningless victory. If each of the due process principles asserted by Dr. Bordeaux still matter, then the judgment in question will be repudiated; and if the truth still matters, then Dr. Bordeaux will be vindicated. No amount of fluff and embellishment on Mr. Spencer's part will change this trajectory. Thank you. Juno Midsomer Principal || Midsomer P.L.L.C. E: [email protected] Ph: (810) 770 73 SA Bar License No. 61186 ___________________________________
  5. Username: J.H.Midsomer Comment: PUBLIC RELEASE] _________________ _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MIDSOMER P.L.L.C. || Los Santos, San Andreas July 31, 2023 Unfortunately, Mr. Spencer's press conference of July 30, 2023 contains a number of inaccuracies. We intend to use those inaccuracies and highlight them in court should the same be repeated in court. Furthermore, while Mr. Spencer is free to put together a press release on any subject matter of his choosing, we think it was inappropriate for him to do so here and to comment on issues that are being litigated in active proceedings. The court record is public; he should speak through the record, and respect the judicial process by letting it play out — and remain — in court. Thank you. Juno Midsomer Principal || Midsomer P.L.L.C. E: [email protected] Ph: 810 770 73 SA Bar License No. 61186 ___________________________________
  6. The ‘sauga. Interesting option because I don’t think anyone outside of Canada has heard of Mississauga!
  7. ] _________________________________________________________ Comments and structured responses may be sent to the journal via e-mail at [email protected] (( PM )). The journal does not publish comments but does make effort to publish structured responses of publishable quality. For comments, please write “comment” followed by the title of the article to which you are replying. For structured response, indicate “response” followed by the title of the article to which you are responding. Topics which gain traction and attract compelling responses may be compiled and published as a debate series. (( The instructions above are found at the journal's site, lsrol.org, for PDF versions of the print edition. Because this is a PDF, public comments are not possible unless published by the journal separately. ))
  8. Username: WestCoastPride Comment: That's an odd and antiquated sign-off for a public announcement prepared in the 21st Century, but, nonetheless, well said. Thank you, also, for your service Sen. Giraldi. Your determination and passion cannot be doubted. I hope next generation will draw inspiration from the the bright spots of your tenure.
  9. The OP’s gut feeling is onto something. They’re right and it’s chiefly a self-insert problem. Let’s not pretend like it’s not. Regrettably, it has always chiefly been self-insert and, equally unfortunate, it always will be. Roleplay has been and continues to be, to a substantial degree, a conduit through which to express edgy or fringe beliefs. Some don’t realize how much roleplay is serving as a conduit for their fringe beliefs; others are quite intentional about it and allow it to serve as conduit. Some try to disguise it by couching their behaviour as trolling; others are quite open about it.
  10. Funny though that may be, it'd also be unrealistic because it would be so blatantly unconstitutional. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) reaffirmed the "constitutional right to travel from one State to another" (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1996)). This is not even the first case to recognize this — quite so, Justice Stevens in the Saenz case cited many earlier cases. In Saenz: The government will have to find some other way!
  11. It seems OP intended to ask why San Andreas lacks legislation establishing termination or employment standards; from what I could glean in his replies, I do not think OP meant "labor laws" in the broadest sense. In any event, as the OP correctly pointed out, San Andreas remains at-will for non-unionized workplaces; and the Labor Relations Act 2021 does not change that because its provisions in the employment domain apply only to unionized workplaces (LRA's provisions regarding occupational hazards are not employment laws — they are regulatory and in the occupational health and safety domain; it would be misleading and misusing semantics to contend otherwise). As to standards that apply to all workplaces, there was an attempt made not long ago, but that proposal — namely, the Employment Termination Standards Act 2021 — did not make it out of committee for a vote.
  12. This. Banning topics because they cause some degree of distress is a slippery slope. Drawing that line is not easy; it would probably be difficult finding the right balance and then explaining away how the line we've drawn captures certain, potentially unforeseen, topics but not others. As has been suggested above, the roleplay surrounding these topics serves as conduit through which people channel their real-life displeasures and views — sometimes those views are too fringe to find widespread acceptance, and sometimes with trolling. While this so-called "self-insert" may be undesirable, it can't be prevented to any significant degree, not least because people can easily lie about what their real-life views are. For this reason, I think we should be focusing less on that fact that the roleplay is self-insert and, instead, should be focusing on practical use. In-character policy should have as much practical consequence as we can give it. Unfortunately, the reality is that the current anti-abortion and anti-transgender laws have little practical purpose; they target probably the smallest subset of roleplayers in the community. That seems like a waste of effort to me. Are there really no pressing issues to resolve and is policy creativity lacking that much that we need to pass policy that affects, for example, only a small subset of female roleplayers?
  13. _________________________________________________________ Comments and structured responses may be sent to the journal via e-mail at [email protected] (( PM )). The journal does not publish comments but does make effort to publish structured responses of publishable quality. For comments, please write “comment” followed by the title of the article to which you are replying. For structured response, indicate “response” followed by the title of the article to which you are responding. Topics which gain traction and attract compelling responses may be compiled and published as a debate series. (( The instructions above are found at the journal's site, lsrol.org, for PDF versions of the print edition. Because this is a PDF, public comments are not possible unless published by the journal separately. ))
  14. I disagree that whether double jeopardy attaches after arraignment depends on whether there was delay. No; it depends on when, in non-jury trials, the defendant is considered exposed to the risk of conviction (Downum). As already said above, in jury trials, the accused is exposed to the risk of conviction when the trial begins (Serfass) and the trial begins, for Fifth Amendment purposes, once the jury is empanelled (Crist). In my view, in a non-jury situation, an accused is at the risk of conviction once they have been brought to appear before the judge and entered any plea — in other words, they are exposed to the risk of conviction once they have been arraigned. As far as I know, there has not been any authoritative or judicial statement as to this because non-jury trials are rare. Double jeopardy also depends on whether the first court made a procedural ruling or substantive one when terminating the case — this was explored in the article. (Remember: there are two questions in all double jeopardy problems, including 1. was the accused in jeopardy / were they exposed to the risk of conviction, and 2. if so, is the second prosecution relying on the same issues that were substantively resolved in the first proceeding). By bringing delay into the analysis, you seem to have conflated the speedy-trial guarantee (Sixth Amendment) with the double-jeopardy guarantee (Fifth Amendment). In any event, as Bopsy pointed out, this isn’t exactly the appropriate ”forum” for this discussion. Feel free to follow up in a DM.
  15. I don’t know exactly why California has done what they’ve done; apparently it has transplanted the terms but uses them only after ensuring the double jeopardy was considered. In other words, the prosecutor makes the request knowing the court did not make a substantive finding and made only a technical procedural ruling (and, thus, double jeopardy doesn’t attach), and the court grants it “without prejudice” if it agrees that its procedural ruling doesn’t prevent a second prosecution attempt — or, otherwise, the court declines the request and instead dismisses “with prejudice” if the court disagrees with the prosecutor regarding the nature of its ruling. The point is that in criminal proceedings, double jeopardy must be considered when terminating and reinstating criminal proceedings. Transplanting this concept without considering double jeopardy risks glossing that over. (Also, as an aside, double jeopardy doesn’t require an acquittal to attach; it attaches long before the acquittal. The caselaw is clear on that point. See Serfass v. United States (held that double jeopardy attaches when trial begins), Crist v. Bretz (held that, for the purposes of double jeopardy, trial begins when the jury is empanelled) and Downum v. United States, also discussed in the article above at p. 3. But in our case, since the trier of fact is always a judge and not a jury — i.e. no jury empaneling is required, contrary to Crist — double jeopardy attaches after the arraignment or the second or third appearance before a judge immediately before trial)
  16. I hope you're joking, Ed. On a serious note: my main issue, as with the whole of the faction, is with portrayal and accuracy. There are lot of inaccuracies and abuses of legal terminology or concepts from prosecutors too. For one notable example, consider the concept of dismissing an action with prejudice / without prejudice. There are a number of criminal proceedings where the prosecution attempt was terminated with or without prejudice. Notice I deliberately wrote "dismissing an action." There is a difference between an action and a prosecuting an indictment; an action refers to civil proceedings only. The concept of a dismissal with or without prejudice applies only to civil proceedings. There is no such thing as dismissing a criminal proceeding "with prejudice" or "without prejudice." You will notice LII's Wex legal encyclopedia entries for "dismissal with prejudice" and "dismissal without prejudice" (click to access) make no reference to criminal proceedings — that is because, again, the concept has no application in criminal proceedings. But here, like summary judgments, it has somehow been transplanted from civil to criminal proceedings; and seemingly, in both instances, without regard to the constitutionality of such transplant or its impact on a criminal defendant's constitutional guarantees. Depending on the stage at which the criminal proceeding was terminated, and on the trial court's determination, the indictment may not be brought and prosecuted again on account of double jeopardy. A double jeopardy analysis is the only thing that should be considered, by prosecutors and by courts, in the context of terminating and reinstituting criminal proceedings. Not to appear to be self-promoting (I have nothing to gain from doing that anyway — I am not doing anything and not active around these parts) but I wrote on the double-jeopardy analysis that prosecutors and courts should be undertaking in this 2019 Los Santos Review of Law article: This is not a concern over some benign inaccuracy — the misuse risks practical consequences for the criminal defendants and the constitutionality of criminal proceedings. Declaring that a prosecution attempt is "dismissed without prejudice" risks glossing over double jeopardy and violating double jeopardy. It would not be difficult to imagine a judge hearing a request to terminate, then granting that request to terminate "without prejudice" and the prosecutor, then, (wrongly) construing that declaration as the court (wrongly) permitting the indictment to be filed and prosecuted again. Depending on when that termination occurred, and on the particulars or reason(s) for that termination, following the court's declaration and prosecuting again would be in violation of double jeopardy, and the second court could fail to see that after getting caught up in the first court's abuse of "dismissal without prejudice." Accuracy is important and misuse here, as much as any other misuse, frequently has practical consequences.
  17. Username: WeTheNorth_2k19 Comment: My comment was looking at enforceability. If you understood it as rhetoric, then you did not understand the issues at all. It does matter because that is what has been enacted — that's the standard which the bill relies on! The bill uses the "detectable fetal heartbeat" standard. The bill does not provide that the moment of fertilization is when life begins; and my comment was about the bill. Either you didn't read the bill before commenting on it or your reading comprehension needs improvement.
  18. Username: WeTheNorth_2k19 Comment: 1. I did not take a stand; I did not say I support terminating fetuses. I only talked about how this bill may be unconstitutional as applied to certain situations, and how it might be difficult enforce the legal test it purports to establish (namely, "detectable fetal heartbeat"). You might fail to see or understand these issues because you're emotional about it, but what due process requires doesn't care about your feelings. 2. Your analogy makes no sense and is incomparable. I'm not nitpicking; lawmaking is about creating legal standards that should be enforceable. It sounds to me like you believe lawmaking is about posturing — sounds like you believe the legislature should enact whatever while enforceability be damned. P.S. Okay neckbeard — one who is insecure about his manhood and perpetually anxious about his wife or girlfriend potentially leaving; I perfectly understand now why you want to control what she does with her body.
  19. Username: WeTheNorth_2k19 Comment: I cannot conjure up a better example of emotion trumping science. Lawmaking based on emotion while purporting to find authority in science. An uncertain legal test—namely, “fetal heartbeat”—based on uncertain medical science will result in due process trouble when it comes time to enforce and apply the law. As Senator Jones keenly pointed out, there is considerable individual variation as to when a fetus develops a detectable heartbeat. In light of the individual variation, I’d like Senator Rossi to answer this straightforward question: how is a medical professional going to investigate after-the-fact, i.e. after that fetus has been aborted, to confirm in court as to whether or not the fetus developed a heartbeat at the time of its abortion? One of the longest-standing due process requirements is that penal laws clearly tell people what they can and cannot do. We know this as the “fair warning” or “fair notice” command. For example, a statue which provides “no person holding a learner’s license may operate a vehicle after 8:00PM” is valid and gives fair warning, assuming it defines “operate” and “vehicle.” That statute warns you that (1) if you hold a class of license known as a learner’s license and (2) you operate a vehicle, pursuant to its definitions of “operate” and “vehicle,” after 8:00PM, you will face the penalty it prescribes. Assuming both “operate” and “vehicle” are defined with sufficient specificity, the statute can be consistently enforced and applied. No issue there. For a more complicated (as we will see below) example, suppose a statute says “no fetus may be aborted after six weeks gestational age.” Assuming “gestational age” is defined pursuant to established medical science, this statute allows a doctor to determine the fetus’ gestational age and know if six weeks have been exceeded. The bill proposed here does not rely on gestational age, though; rather, it relies on “fetal heartbeat." Of course, there is nothing disempowering or stopping the legislature from changing a legal standard, or benchmark, so to speak. However, the legal test it has articulated may result in inconsistent enforcement and applications, which is when due process issues arise. And that’s the problem with this new “fetal heartbeat” standard — it risks greater inconsistency and is difficult to enforce. The example here is complicated by the fact that gestational age test may be as much liable to variation as the fetal heartbeat test — both tests, in other words, lack certainty. Therefore, both tests are liable to enforcement and, by extension, due process issues. “Fetal heartbeat” is not a better standard than gestational age; it may even be worse and result in more inconsistency. It may very well be more difficult to enforce because, assuming the aborted fetus is intact, determining that fetus’ gestational age after-the-fact may be easier than determining whether it had a heartbeat at the time it was aborted. A cloud of trouble, with enforcement and due process, is brewing on the horizon for this bill.
  20. I understand there are people who will disagree, but jurisdiction disagreements and violations of any contracts would actually bring a lot of interesting roleplay. These conflicts might involve, for example, arbitration (if the departments manage to find an experienced legal professional roleplaying an arbitrator); then further legal proceedings, perhaps even appeals; and if the courts get something wrong, lawmakers could intervene by using their expansive lawmaking powers — taking the issue, at that point, from legal to political and bringing about political roleplay. Roleplay at GTA:W will never reach its full potential if it is stifled by OOC-forced cooperation; it won't reach its full potential if LFM is nannying cooperation between factions and enforces cooperation. These things should be molded IC, drawing in various government and non-government actors. Note I have not made a comment about corruption and the rule requiring corruption perms. I still think there should be some OOC oversight of corruption. So, for example, if a jurisdiction "war" leads to someone to contemplating corrupt intentions, there should still be LFM oversight of that plot line. Otherwise, the jurisdiction conflicts should be left to be molded by IC forces and actors. OOC nannying makes roleplay linear and repetitive; it dampens passions and, as a result, limits opportunities.
  21. Anyone have this game on PC? Is it any good? Apparently there’s a crossover mission in the game that incorporates elements from the Stranger Things series — such as the demogorgons and Mind Flayer. I thought it was pretty cool that the developers put in that crossover (Stranger Things was awesome; I’m excited for the upcoming fourth and fifth seasons)
  22. The he should be a she in this case (or maybe go with the neutral "they're the boss!") Also, can we vote for inactive characters?
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